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POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN GERMANY:
THE YEARS OF SEMISOVEREIGNTY, 1949 - 1955
Richard L . Merritt +
When the American Military Government was replaced in
1949 by the U
.S . High Commission for Germany (HICOG),
it continued the series of public opinion surveys con-
ducted since 1945 in the American zone of occupation
and in 1951 even expanded them to include nationwide
samples
. The resulting data were analyzed and presented
in periodic reports published by the HICOG Reactions
Analysis Staff ; the datacards themselves were lost or
destroyed.
Among the topics included in the surveys were the West
Germans' transition from Nazi domination through a
decade of occupation by foreign powers to substantial
independence ; the Federal Republic's relations with
the East, German reunification, rearmament, and West
European unity ; responses to American information pro-
grams ; and the view of East Germans on a variety of
topics
. Taken together the data indicate that the
years of semisovereignty produced (or strenthened) a
new orthodoxy in the Federal Republic . The FRG was
not the model democracy for which American occupiers
had initially hoped, but it was a popular, stable, and
effective democracy in a formal sense.
The rise of the German phoenix from the ashes of World War II has
been a topic of never-ending scholarly fascination . During the war
itself, some Allied writers and statesmen had called for the destruc-
tion, or at least dismemberment and pastoralization, of the country
from which three major wars had sprung in less than three generations.
Final wartime decisions nonetheless foresaw the eventual resumption
of its rightful place in the comity of nations by a peaceful, demo-
cratic, united Germany
. Deepening hostility among the victors was
to frustrate this goal
. By mid-1949 the country had indeed been
dismembered : Poland and the Soviet Union had incorporated some of
it into their own territory, and the remainder had been divided
into two states, with the tiny enclave of West Berlin left under
western Allied control but surrounded by the hostile German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR).
The areas of prewar Germany (excluding Berlin) occupied by the
American, British, and French military were merged in 1949 to form
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
. Initial antogonisms among
the three Western Allies had ultimately given way in the face of
a perceived Soviet threat to a willingness both to cooperate with
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each other and to reconstruct the Western rump of Germany as a
bulwark against the new enemy . In 1946 the American and British merged
their zones of occupation into, what came to be called "Bizonia,"
and with the London agreements of 1947—48 came the addition of the
French zone and a general currency reform for "Trizonia." The Lon-
don agreements also called for a constituent assembly that would
draft a constitution for the trizonal area . This constitution -or
"Basic Law" as the West Germans termed it, to indicate that it was
only a provisional document- provided the basis for
the promulgation in September 1949 of the Federal Republic.
Although nominally sovereign, the Federal Republic continued under
the tutelage of the Western Allies until May 1955
. American, Bri-
tish, and French military governments were replaced by High Commi-
sions, which retained certain tights of occupation, most notably
in the areas of foreign policy and defence
.(1) Along with these
rights came a deeply-felt responsibility to see to it that the FRG
would develop into a strong but peaceful ally
. This meant pumping
vast sums into West Germany to build up its economy
. It meant
laying the groundwork for West German defense forces that could
contribute to Western defenses . And it meant creating a set of
institutional bonds in the field of politics and economics that
would tie the FRG inextricably to its West European neighbors.
The half-dozen years of semisovereignty comprised a period of
immense growth for the FRG . Political stability reigned at home,
under the firm (or, in the view of this opponents, sometimes author-
itarian) hand of Konrad Adenauer, the FRG's first Federal Chancellor.
Its economy was still in ruins in 1949, but by 1955 the country had
achieved full employment as well as a moderate level of prosperity.
It was well on its way to becoming the economic giant that it is
today
. The FRG had joined with France, Italy, and the Benelux coun-
tries to form the European Goal and Steel Community, which by 1955
was moving toward a more general European Economic Community .. More-
over, despite the dashed hopes for a European Defense Community, a
way had been found to permit the FRG to rearm under the aegis of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
. Functioning democracy in West
Germany itself and such international measures as the decision to
pay reparations to Israel for the crimes committed against the Jews
by the Nazi regime allayed at least the western world's fears about
the future of the country.
In short, by late 1954 only the permission of the western Allies
was lacking to permit the Federal Republic to assume full sovereign-
ty over its own affairs . The Paris agreements of that October paved
the way, and in May 1955 the FRG launched its course of independence.
Under Adenauer's continued leadership, it moved even more toward
West European economic union, took the steps necessary to set up a
new military establishment (albeit under strict controls to maintain
its democratic character, and fully integrated into the NATO concept),
and undertook new diplomatic initiatives, almost always to be sure
in full consultation with the former occupying powers .
- 18
-
HICOG Surveys
The general historical lines of the period of semisovereignty are
well known
.(2) What is less understood is the set of perspectives
-values, beliefs, and attitudes- that moved the West German
population during these difficult years . To what extent had they really
thrown off the yoke of Nazism? How much legitimacy did they accord
the new federal government? What did they think about their
country's future rearmament, or economic ties with France and the rest
of West Europe, or the threat of their security ostensibly posed
by the Soviet Union? How important to them was the eventual reuni-
fication of a-11 Germany? What hopes did they entertain that the
eastern territories would be restored to Germany, that the FRG and
GDR could in fact come to terms on a plan for merger?
All these questions and more are the stuff of which the West German
domestic political scene was made
. Public opinion might not be able
to forge new policies for the FRG, but it could at leasttell
leading statesmen what the sources and limits of their public support
were
. Politicians, especially in the conservative Christian Democ-
ratic Union (CDU), were quick to recognize the value of public
opinion surveys -even if they often did not heed their findings on
matters of policy. It is no small wonder, then, that surveying organ-
izations flourished during the early 195os in the Federal Republic .(3 )
Very early in their occupation, American officials in Germany had
understood the usefulness of public opinion surveys for their own
purposes . Even before fighting had died down in some instances,
social psychologists and sociologists in the Psychological Warfare
Division of the U .S . Army entered towns to survey their populations'
potential for resistance, attitudes toward Nizism, and expectations
about the pending military occupation . By October 1945 informal
surveying had been institutionalized by the Opinion Survey Section
of the Information Control Division, Office of Military Government
(U .S .), which subsequently conducted 72 major surveys in the Amer-
ican zone of occupation
. Topics explored by these OMGUS surveys
were as diverse as attitudes toward Hitler, bathing habits, the
growing split among the wartime Allies, and readership ofnewspapers
and magazines .(4)
With the formal end of the military occupation in September 1949,
the U .S . High Commission for Germany (HICOG) replaced the Office of
Military Government, and the Opinion Survey Section became the
Reaction Analysis Staff within the HICOG Office of Public Affairs.
Surveying operations, under the direction of Dr . Leo P . Crespi,
continued unabated . By the end of 195o the Reaction Analysis Staff
had both expanded its sample to include the whole of the Federal
Republic and engaged the newly-formed Deutsches Institut für Volks-
umfragen (DIVO) to conduct the fieldwork
. The Reaction Analysis
Staff later became part of the Research Staff of the Office of Pub-
lic Affairs, United States Embassy, when the Federal Republic at-
tained virtually complete sovereignty in May 1955.
The HICOG Reaction Analysis Staff carried out more than loo surveys
of West German public opinion during its five and a half years of
existence . The surveys were mainly of two types
. Regularly monthly
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surveys, requiring about three weeks of fieldwork, were based on
interviews with approximately 3 .000 adults in the territory that
had formerly comprised the American zone of occupation, 50o in West
Berlin, and 30o in the American-held enclave of Bremen in the former
British Zone
. They generally used a "split-sample" approach, giving
slightly different questionnaires to the two halves of each sample.
Second, in October 1950 "flash" surveys were introduced . They sought
to ascertain very quickly the views of a relatively small number of
people (about 640) living in major cities throughout the Federal
Republic
. The flash survey was replaced in March 1951 by an inter-
mediate sample of 800 West Germans, selected nationwide on the basis
of stratified probability procedures .(5) At the same time, the regu-
lar surveys were broadened to include a representative sample from
the whole of West Germany and West Berlin . Occasional surveys of
special samples, such as West Berliners or youth, also took place.
Some of these, to be discussed in greater detail below, interviewed
GDR citizens attending public events in West Berlin, or else former
GDR citizens who had fled into the Federal Republic.
The data, whether stemming from surveys conducted directly under the
auspices of HICOG officials or those developed by DIVO, were ana-
lyzed and presented in periodic reports published by the Reaction
Analysis Staff
. Most of the data cards themselves have disappeared
-lost, some say, when the Rhine River overflowed its banks, or, alter-
nately, destroyed when American archivists made an administrative
decision that IBM cards were not worth preserving once they had been
analyzed by the appropriate government agencies, or, perhaps, still
packed in boxes stashed in a corner of some forgotten warehouse .(6)
What remain is a set of 237 reports prepared from September 1949 to
May 1955 and ranging in length from four to 369 pages (with the
average 33 pages long).
SOME MAIN DIMENSIONS OF GERMAN POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
Here is not the place to analyze in detail the full set of HICOG
reports
.(7) In them, the reader will find indications of West
German public perspectives on matters as diverse as adult education
and massive retaliation, West European unity and agricultural exhi-
bits arranged by the United States Information Service (USIS)
. The
following pages will merely point to some of the main dimensions of
German public opinion from 1949 to 1955
. One set of attitudes of
particular interest to HICOG pollsters and later scholars deals with
the West Germans' transition from Nazi domination through a decade
of occupation by foreign powers to substantial independence . How
did they view their Nazi past, Allied programs designed to bring
democracy to their country, their new federal government? A second
set centers on three aspects of West Germany's position in the
world : its relations with the east, German reunification, and West
European unity . Finally, data based on interviews with East Germans
provide some interesting insights.
Coming to Terms with Nazism
The intent of the Allied occupation of Germany after World War II
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was to ensure that the country would never again become a threat to
its European neighbors and the peace of the world . Germans, for their
part, could simply look about them to know that National Socialism
had failed . But how did the people feel about the Third Reich? Was
the war, with its attendant loss of life and physical destruction,
a necessary consequence of National Socialism itself, or was it due
merely to bad judgment on the part of its leaders? How would they
respond to a resurgence of Nazism?
Data from the HICOG surveys reveal that, by the mid-1950s, West
Germans had for the most part rejected the formal trappings of Na-
zism . These organizations and their leaders -not the German
people had thrust their country into a devastatingly destructive war . The
population was in no mood to make the same mistake again . Even if
some attitudes associated with Nazism might remain, politicians
and parties identifying themselves too closely with the repudiated
past had little future in the Federal Republic.
The data also underscore a second and equally important point : West
Germans wanted the books closed on the Nazi era . Since those respon-
sible for the war and the major crimes had been punished adequately
(if sometimes unfairly), they argued in effect, it was time for the
western Allies to quit imposing their restrictions upon German
politics and society . This was particularly the case, in the West German
view, if the West seriously wanted the Federal Republic as an ally
in the struggle against "international communism" . "The war is over",
West Germans were saying ; "Bet t s get on with the fight for peace with
justice".
From Foreign Occupation to Independence
Views of the past aside, the critical question facing Allied offi-
cials was how the population would respond to its new politicalsystem.
Prognostications ranged from bleak to euphoric, with most recognizing
a democratic tendency that only time and constructive participation
could make firm . It would require the entrenchment of certain kinds
of habits -assuming civic responsibilities, becoming informed, voting,
obeying just laws, paying taxes, making occasional short-term sacri-
fices in the community interest, and the like . HICOG officials
could observe progress made (or not made) in many of these areas.
What they also wanted to know was how the West Germans felt about
the polity developing around them.
Data yielded by the HICOG surveys on the federal government, parties
and elections, and the Federal Republic's first chancellor, Konrad
Adenauer, suggest widespread acceptance by the West German public of
their political institutions and leadership . There was, of course,
a darker side . One problem was the continuing if low level of sup-
port for a new rightwing party -a situation which, although not like-
ly to endanger democracy in Germany, nonetheless upset the western
Allies . There was also substantial dissent on such policies pursued
by the Adenauer government as those dealing with housing, the Saar,
rearmament, reunification, and "reparations" to Israel . None of this
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proved to be divisive . To the contrary, West Germans repeatedly
demonstrated that they stood behind their government whatever their
personal preferences and disappointments may have been.
What seemed to bother the West German public most of all were the
continued Allied controls of their government's autonomy . Even the
elation occasioned by the promulgation in May 1955 of the Paris
accords, which ended the occupation, was tempered by the realiza-
tion that the Allies retained some residual rights, that the FRG was
not truly independent
. Achieving this level of autonomy had been no
mean task
. And, ironically, given the Allies' earlier insistence
on German disarmament, the most significant stumbling block was the
way in which an independent West Germany should defend itself.
Should Germany be rearmed, and, if so, how?
Rearmament
Uppermost in the minds of the wartime Allies was the final destruc-
tion of Germany's military potential . At their meeting in Potsdam
in mid-,1945, Attlee, Stalin, and Truman agreed on "the complete dis-
armament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination of all
German industry that could be used for military production" . By 1949,
however, the world's climate had changed . American military officials,
impressed by their view of the Soviet threat to West Europe, were
agitating for a West German contribution to the western defense
structure
. And, in December of that year, in an interview with an
American journalist, Chancellor Adenauer let it be known that he
would favor participation by German military units in some type of
western defense system but not a separate West German army
. After
the outbreak of the Korean war in 195o the answer to the question
of German rearmament was a foregone conclusion
. The salient issues
were timing and form.
HICOG data on attitudes toward rearmament were mixed, and depended
very very much on the wording of the questions asked of respondents.
Despite initial hostility to the idea of an independent West German
army, there was substantial recognition that Germany could not be
defended without West German participation
. Schemes for integrating
FRG contingents into a more general European army found increasing
favor
. Even the European Defense Community, proposed by Rene Plevan
in late 195o, negotiated in 1952, and rejected by the French parlia-
ment in August 1954, seemed better than nothing to large numbers of
West Germans
. Support for the EDC nonetheless declined as the percep-
tion grew that the French were trying to attach conditions which
would make the FRG a second-class member . The ultimate failure of
EDC led to a new plan, embodied in the Paris agreements of October
1954 and realized in May 1955, which corresponded closely to the
expressed German preference for a national army that would partici-
pate in the defense of West Europe rather than the integration of
German divisions in a general West European army.
Germany in the World
The Occupation Statute of 1949 left ultimate responsibility for the
- 22 -
conduct of West Germany's foreign relations with the Western Allies.
The years between 1949 and 1955 were nonetheless ones in which the
Federal Republic was fashioning its future foreign affairs environ-
ment . By and large, Adenauer's government pursued a policy of firm
alliance with the west, eschewing detente with the east temporarily
in the hope that strength . in the West would force the Soviet Union
to adopt a more conciliatory policy . German rearmament, then, was
tied closely to east-west relations in Europe and the world-, the
question of German reunification, and steps toward economic and
even political integration in West Europe.
West Germans were somewhat ambivalent in the early 1950s about the
role that their country should play between east and West . On the
one hand, they expressed an attachment to the west, especially the
United States, almost as strong as their antipathy to the east . They
were capable, on the other hand, of putting aside sentimental pre-
ferences when they calculated the prospects for war between east and
west, and asked themselves what role the FRG should play in the
event one did break out . Those who longed for neutrality nonetheless
recognized that such a course would be impracticable, if for no other
reason that the United States would not permit a neutral Germany,
and that refusal to go along with the West would merely postpone
eventual West German sovereignty . Although they might have preferred
otherwise, then, West Germans realized that they had no real choice
but to opt for alliance with the West.
Sentiments in favor of reunification were uniformly strong . Few,
however, were willing to archieve it by paying a political price,
such as the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line as the German boundary
or the withdrawal of American guaranties of security . Many felt that
a policy of strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union would make reunifica-
tion of Germany more likely. A decreasing number held out any hope
that this goal would be achieved.
Throughout the early 1950s West Germans strongly backed steps to
unite West Europe . The most significant concrete step during this
period in the direction of West European unity was the European
Coal and Steel Community, endorsed by more than two of three Germans.
The European Defense Community, as noted earlier, was more problem-
atic . Moderate West German resentments toward France emerged during
two periods when the EDC was under discussions -first, the months
before May 1952, when it had appeared to some that the French
planned to use EDC as a means for limiting West Germany's autonomy;
and, second, from late 1953 to the summer of 1954, when the French
dragged their feet on ratifying the agreement . The Saar question,
too, raised doubts in the minds of many West Germans about French
intentions, but not enough to lead them to reject the more general
movement toward West European unity.
All these data point to the fact that the West German population
was not wholly convinced of the linkage between international
institution-building in the economic sphere and the western defense
alliance . Nationalistic leaders might have used this popular ambiva-
lence as a basis for asserting a greater measure of West German inde-
pendence in European and world politics
. It is noteworthy, however,
that the Adenauer government did not do so
. It saw the somewhat un-
settled state of public opinion rather as guaranteeing its freedom
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of action to pursue policies that strengthened western defenses and
West European integration.
East German Perspectives
Berlin of the 1950s provided a unique opportunity for Allied offi-
cials to gain insights into the perspectives and behavior of East
Germans . Despite the division in 1949 of Germany and Berlin, access
between the two halves of the former capital city remained fairly
free
. HICOG officials could thus observe events in the Soviet-con-
trolled portion of the city, and visits by East Berliners and other
citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) gave the Reaction
Analysis Staff an opportunity to conduct direct interviews . From
August 195o to the end of the occupation period, in addition to its
more frequent and exhaustive surveys of West Germans and West Ber-
liners, it conducted at least 19 separate samplings of East German
views on a wide range of topics .(8)
Respondents presented a fairly bleak picture of daily life in the
GDR . Each group had its own special complaints : young people about
the pre-eminent position given to the Free German Youth, pupils
about Marxism in their classes, farmers about collectivization,
and housewives about food shortages. They were nonetheless fairly
united in estimating the popular mood to be bad or very bad, and
feeling that the East Germans themselves could do little to improve
their political situation . They demonstrated a certain pride in
their anti-government uprising of June 17th, 1953 . Few, however, anti-
cipated new demonstrations, and fewer still thought that new demon-
strations would actually benefit GDR citizens.
GDR visitors to West Berlin had by and large a positive image of
western life, political institutions, and leaders . They strongly
supported Western policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union . They also listed
reunification among their most important goals even though they were
not at all sanguine about the prospects for achieving it . Least of
all were they willing to see the west abandon its efforts toward
West German rearmament and West European unity in what they saw as
a futile attempt to placate the Soviet Union.
To the extent that the respondents were truly representative of
their compatriots, these findings bore heavy implications for western
policymakers . One point was that the west could count on considerable
passive resistance in the GDR to any new moves by either Ulbricht's
government or the USSR
. Second, the west could be assured of sub-
stantial support from GDR citizens for its own policies -and the
tougher these policies were, the better the East Germans seemed to
like them! But third, by the same token, the west bore some moral
obligation to East Germans not to let them down in their times of
trial . The extent to which such perceptions strengthened or at least
supported the militancy of the west, including the FRG, can only be
guessed . What we do know from recorded history, however, is that
West German statesmen frequently mentioned such points when defending
their policies privately or in public
.
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A BALANCE SHEET
The data contained in the HICOG reports, which encompass West Ger-
many's 56 months of semisovereignty, provide important insights into
the changing social structure and perspectives of that country . West
Germans demonstrated that Nazism as a movement was a thing of the
past, that they were fairly solidly behind new federal government.
As far as the dynamics of international politics were concerned,
they lined up with the west, not only because of an antipathy to
the Soviet Union or a desire to hasten their country's full autono-
my, but also because they saw concrete advantages in being a member
of the emerging western constellation . The decision to ally with the
west meant, of course, acceptance of the prospect that Germany would
not be reunited in the foreseeable future . Only by building by west-
ern strength, however, West Germans felt, could the Soviet Union be
forced to give way on this issue.
In short, judging by public opinion data, the years of semisover-
eignty had produced -or strengthened, if you will- a new orthodoxy.
The FRG was not the model democracy for which American occupiers had
initially hoped, but it was a popular, stable, and effective democra-
cy in a formal sense . Its very strength gave the Federal Republic
the breathing space that it would need to expand of democracy's less
formal aspects, such as social justice and equality . The firm hand
of Adenauer, moreover, pushed the country persistently toward its
rehabilitation in the world comity of nations . Even if complete
independence escaped it in the early 1950s, the FRG would even-
tually achieve as much of it as any state has in the modern world.
Whatever its more troublesome aspects, then, the political System
that developed in West Germany from 1949 to 1955 provided a solid
basis for autonomous and democratic growth.
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